Money Damages and Corrective
Advertising:

An Economic Analysis
Paul Healdt
In unfair competition cases, injunctive relief is the norm1 for
three reasons. First, it is difficult to prove and then calculate actual
damages. Second, an injunction alone usually provides substantial
relief.2 Third, the substantive law of damages in the field of unfair
competition3 is uncertain and unstable. One commentator on the
Lanham Act 4 notes that, when courts grant money damages, the
"confluence of evidentiary complexity and legal confusion has resulted in some plaintiffs receiving windfall recoveries while others
find injuries uncompensated; meanwhile, defendants face uncertain
liability and capricious penalties."' 5 This instability in the law has
led to diverse attempts to address the damage issue.
Perhaps the most troubling development in the search for an
accurate, consistent rationale for awarding money damages in unfair competition cases has been the federal courts' adaptation of
the Federal Trade Commission's ("FTC") injunctive remedy of
corrective advertising. Federal courts have applied this rationale-usually used to justify corrective advertising injunctions-to

t A.B. 1980, University of Illinois; A.M. 1982, University of Illinois; J.D. Candidate
1988, The University of Chicago.
1 J. Thomas McCarthy, 2 Trademarks and Unfair Competition 495 (2d ed. 1984); Edward J. Kessler and Robert W. Sacoff, Products of the Mind: Proving Damages in Intellectual Property Cases, 20 Trial 40, 42 (July 1984).
2 Champion Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 131 (1947) (accounting of defendant's
profits denied "where an injunction will satisfy the equities of the case"). See also Foxtrap,
Inc. v. Foxtrap, Inc., 671 F.2d 636, 641-42 (D.C.Cir. 1982).
3 This comment refers to "unfair competition" as the species of business tort encompassing the infringement of trademarks, trade names, trade dress, trade symbols, service
marks, product designs, packaging, and the like. Other torts such as monopolization, interference, or price fixing, often included under the rubric "unfair competition," may raise
different issues and will not be discussed except when analogy is helpful.
" 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (Supp. 1985). The Lanham Act provides for the registration
and regulation of trademarks used in interstate commerce.
5 James M. Koelemay, Jr., Monetary Relief for Trademark Infringement Under the
Lanham Act, 72 T.M.R. 458, 458 (1982). Koelemay's article is the most extensive recent
discussion of damages in trademark and unfair competition cases.
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damage actions arising under the Lanham Act and common law.6
The federal courts' version of corrective advertising uses the defendant's advertising expenditures as a measure of money damages. The court makes this award without requiring the plaintiff to
quantify his actual damages.7
Although neither judicial opinions nor the academic literature
have examined the validity of this relief in depth, courts have used
the corrective advertising injunction rationale to justify two of the
largest damage awards in the history of trademark law.8 Money
damage awards for corrective advertising are not always of momentous proportions, 9 but the fear that courts will base damages on
often substantial advertising budgets adds a new and controversial
factor which companies must consider in product marketing and
litigation decisions.
This comment demonstrates that corrective advertising damage awards are unjustified because they miscompensate plaintiffs,
cause undesirable market behavior, and impose needless costs on
businesses and consumers. Part I of the comment examines how
the federal courts adopted the corrective advertising measure of
damages as an attempt to compensate plaintiffs for lost good will.
Part II explores the arbitrary and unprecedented nature of the
awards. Part III acknowledges the need to compensate for damage
to good will, but explains in economic terms how the corrective
advertising damage awards result in an inefficient level of deterrence and impose excessive social costs. Part IV sets forth alternative accounting methods which more precisely measure damage to
good will.

6

See Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber, 408 F.Supp. 1219 (D.Colo.

1976), aff'd as modified 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1977).
7 See McCarthy, 2 Trademarks at 512 (cited in note 1). See also J. Thomas McCarthy,
Important Trends in Trademark and Unfair Competition Law during the Decade of the
1970's, 71 T.M.R. 93, 107-112 (1981). This comment uses the term "corrective advertising"
to describe damage awards based on the actual amount spent by the defendanf on advertising or on the amount a court speculates a plaintiff would have to spend to "counteract" a
defendant's advertising.
8 See U-Haul Intern., Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 793 F.2d 1034, 1037 (9th Cir. 1986) ($6 million of award based on the defendant's advertising expenditures); Big 0, 561 F.2d at 1375
($678,302 award based on 25 percent of defendant's advertising costs).
I West Des Moines State Bank v. Hawkeye Bancorp., 722 F.2d 411, 412 (8th Cir. 1983)
($18,876); Durbin Brass Works, Inc. v. Schuler, 532 F.Supp. 41, 44 (E.D.Mo. 1982) ($10,000);
Hain Pure Food Co., Inc. v. Sona Food Products Co., 491 F.Supp. 39, 41 (C.D.Cal. 1980)

($1,000).
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I.

A.

THE EMERGENCE OF CORRECTIVE ADVERTISING

Money Damages and Unfair Competition

In the typical unfair competition case, the plaintiff brings a
motion for a preliminary injunction, claiming that the defendant
infringed rights established in the plaintiff's product or trademark.
Upon a showing that a likelihood of confusion exists between the
products or trademarks in question, and subject to the particular
equitable balancing used in the jurisdiction, the plaintiff almost
certainly will be entitled to an injunction.1 0 Actual confusion need
not be proven.1 1 At this point, litigants settle most cases out of
court. Because the disposition of the motion for a preliminary injunction effectively decides the most important issue in the
case-likelihood of success on the merits-further litigation is usually unnecessary. Plaintiffs seldom pursue a trial through the damage phase because it is expensive, and because the court's preliminary injunction decision usually gives plaintiffs a good idea of what
amount of damages they might expect. Thus, it is more efficient for
plaintiffs to pursue damage awards through settlement negotiations than through trial.
Plaintiffs who pursue money damages at trial face uncertainty
among "the hodgepodge and confusion in judge-made rules of re1 2 At least four different bases exist on which to award
covery."1
compensatory damages:
(1) profits lost by plaintiff due to infringement;
(2) actual business losses caused by the infringement other
than lost profits;
(3) defendant's profits as an estimate of plaintiff's lost profits;
or
(4) defendant's profits on an unjust enrichment theory.1

10 See Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Communications, Inc., 675 F.2d 852, 858 (7th
Cir. 1982) (trademark infringement presumptively occasions irreparable harm).
n See cases collected in McCarthy, 2 Trademarks at 50-55 (cited in note 1) (likelihood
of confusion presumptively results in irreparable harm).
12 Koelemay, 72 T.M.R. at 525 (cited in note 5). See also Burndy Corp. v. Teledyne
Industries, Inc., 748 F.2d 767, 771-73 (2d Cir. 1984) (discussion of damage approaches).
13 McCarthy, 2 Trademarks at 494 (cited in note 1). These measures are used under
both common law and the Lanham Act which specifically provides that[w]hen a violation of any right of the registrant of a mark registered in the Patent and

Trademark Office shall have been established . . .the plaintiff shall be entitled, ...

subject to the principles of equity, to recover (1) defendant's profits, (2) any damages
sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the action.
15 U.S.C. § 1117 (emphasis added).
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However, the abstract nature of trademark rights causes difficulty
in proving causation and calculating damages.
Recent cases illustrate the evidentiary hurdles which block the
path of would-be claimants. Courts have required proof of actual
confusion, 14 bad faith or intent,1" and damage to reputation;"6 in
addition, courts have denied damages in the absence of direct competition. 7 Courts, however, are not hostile in principle to the idea
of damages; they simply are reluctant to quantify them on speculative or uncertain grounds."" Courts have fashioned these evidentiary rules in order to ensure that only concrete damages are compensated. For example, courts applying the rule that they will not
award damages in the absence of competition do not deny that
damage may have occurred; rather, they find that the quantification of damages is overly speculative absent competition. This may
explain partially the appeal of basing a damage award on the defendant's advertising expenditures: the court can easily calculate
the award and the award bears some relation to the damage done
through customer confusion to the plaintiff's reputation. 19
B.

Corrective Advertising Outside the FTC

Federal courts have applied corrective advertising damages in
unfair competition cases in two ways. First, courts sometimes have
been willing to award money damages equivalent to the amount
actually spent by the plaintiff to counteract the defendant's advertising.2 0 Thus, in Cuisinarts,Inc. v. Robot-Coupe Intern. Corp.,2
the court held that the plaintiff could recover as damages any
" Perfect Fit Industries., Inc. v. Acme Quilting Co., Inc., 618 F.2d 950, 955 (2d Cir.
1980).
15 Aris-Isotoner Gloves, Inc. v. Fownes Bros. & Co., 594 F.Supp. 15, 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
16 St. Charles Mfg. Co. v. Mercer, 737 F.2d 891, 893 (11th Cir. 1983).
17 Raxton Corp. v. Anania Associates, Inc., 668 F.2d 622, 625 (1st Cir. 1982).
18 Foxtrap, 671 F.2d at 641-42 ("If the district court's award was to compensate plaintiff for its losses, there is no adequate record support for the dollar amount."); Raxton, 668
F.2d at 625.
19 The court in Big 0, 408 F.Supp. at 1232, held
[t]hat confusion is, in itself, damage. The appearance of dishonesty and wrongful conduct by Big 0 harms its reputation within the trade and with the public. It is reasonable to redress that wrong by giving the plaintiff enough money to conduct an advertising program of its own.
20 Cuisinarts, Inc. v. Robot-Coupe Intern. Corp., 580 F.Supp. 634, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
See also Obear-Nester Glass Co. v. United Drug Co., 149 F.2d 671, 674 (8th Cir. 1945);
Taussig v. Wellington Fund, Inc., 187 F.Supp. 179, 221-22 (D.Del. 1960), aff'd 313 F.2d 472
(3d Cir. 1963); Century Distilling Co. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 86 F.Supp. 503, 505506 (E.D.Pa. 1949), afrd 205 F.2d 140 (3d Cir. 1953).
1 580 F.Supp. 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).

1988]

Money Damages and Corrective Advertising

money it had spent on "reparative advertising" to correct false impressions created by the defendant.2 2 This approach has not generated much criticism. Under the Lanham Act, actual costs incurred
by victims of infringement usually are recoverable.2" Although
courts should make available the defense that the counter-advertising performed was unreasonable or wasteful, most courts are
willing to accept counter-advertising costs as recoverable business
losses. A victim of infringement is well situated to evaluate exactly
how his business is being affected by unfair competition; a rule
which allows recovery of pre-judgment counter-advertising expenditures provides few incentives for plaintiffs to over-advertise and
seldom overcompensates because the award is never greater than
the actual amount spent by the plaintiff.2"
This comment is more concerned with the second form in
which federal courts have adapted the FTC's corrective advertising
injunction remedy. Some courts permit damages based on the advertising expenditures of the defendant, not the actual cost, if any,
of counter-advertising actually done by the plaintiff.2 5 These damage awards warrant careful scrutiny.
Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber is the
seminal case in this area. 26 Big 0 involved Goodyear's marketing of
a radial tire advertised as "BIGFOOT." Goodyear spent $10 million advertising the tire nationwide although it had prior knowledge of a "BIG FOOT" bias-ply tire being sold by Big 0 Tire Dealers, an association of independent dealers operating in fourteen
states. The jury awarded Big 0 $2.8 million in compensatory damages and $16.8 million in punitive damages.2 7 The district court affirmed the award of $2.8 million on a corrective advertising theory,
in spite of its explicit finding that:
there is no evidence that any direct economic losses resulted.
The plaintiff did not produce evidence of lost sales of Big 0
tires or any other type of lost income. Moreover, the evidence
is clear that no dealers were lost and, indeed, new dealers

22

Id. at 641.

23

See 15 U.S.C. § 1117 ("any damages sustained by plaintiff" are recoverable) (empha-

sis added).
24 A plaintiff might perform in bad faith an excessive amount of advertising, but the
uncertainty of winning a subsequent suit usually should diminish this possibility. However,
a defense of inefficient advertising always should be available.
"s See cases cited in notes 8 and 9. See also Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. v. Hertz
Corp., 223 U.S.P.Q. 1255, 1256, 226 U.S.P.Q. 95, 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
11 408 F.Supp. 1219 (D.Colo. 1976), aff'd as modified, 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1977).
17 This amount was reduced to $678,000 and $4 million on appeal. 561 F.2d at 1375-76.
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were added to the organization during the time of this concurrent use.28
The court held that "[t]he damages awarded by the jury would
enable Big 0 to do an equivalent volume of advertising in the
states in which there are Big 0 dealers... [T]he fact of damage
has been established with reasonable certainty. There is no doubt
that Big O's trademark was affected by Goodyear's $10,000,000 advertising program. ' ' 9
Following Big 0, the Eighth Circuit affirmed a similar award
in West Des Moines State Bank v. Hawkeye Bancorp. ("West
Bank"). Affirming a finding that the defendant's use of its trade
name "West Bank" infringed plaintiff's trademark rights, the
Eighth Circuit found that the district court properly awarded damages based on 25 percent of the defendant's advertising expenditures.31 The court awarded this amount despite the lack of evidence of quantifiable damage to the plaintiff. It noted:
[defendant] argues that a damage award for corrective advertising is not permitted under applicable federal or state statutes. Simply put, the law does not have a remedy for a business whose trade name has been diluted, absent evidence of
actual dollar loss to the plaintiff or actual dollar gain to the
defendant. We do not agree.32
Convinced that infringement had harmed the plaintiff's trade
name, the court refused to let uncertainty bar an award.
More recently, in U-Haul Intern. Inc. v. Jartran,Inc. 3 the
Ninth Circuit affirmed a $40 million judgment against a truck
rental company guilty of Lanham Act and common law violations.
After finding liability for misleading and deceptive use of U-Haul's
trademark, the district court calculated damages as follows: $6 million based on Jartran's advertising expenditures plus $13.6 million
based on U-Haul's actual counter-advertising expenses. The court
28 408 F.Supp. at 1230. The $2.8 million figure was arrived at because Big 0 operated in

14 states, 28 percent of the 50 states in which Goodyear spent its $10 million in advertising.
Id. at 1231.
12 Id. at 1232-33 (original emphasis). The court acknowledged the "fact of damage" in
spite of the lack of evidence of direct economic loss on the theory that confusion presumptively causes damage to a trademark's good will.
30 722 F.2d 411 (1983).
31 Id. at 414. The court remanded, however, for recalculation of the base amount from
which the 25 percent was to be derived because it found that not all of the defendant's
advertising materials-for example, undistributed stationery-actually reached the public.
32

Id. at 413.

33 793 F.2d 1034 (9th Cir. 1986).
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then doubled these amounts under 15 U.S.C. § 111711 to produce a
total award of $40 million.35 The case is especially striking because
the court explicitly found the corrective advertising damage award
to be authorized by federal law. Previous courts, although finding
Lanham Act violations, had been hesitant to justify the corrective
advertising damage award under federal law.36 Given that most unfair competition cases are decided under the Lanham Act, the
case's precedential value is potentially great.
C. Corrective Advertising and the FTC
Since 1969, the FTC on occasion has required parties guilty of
deceptive advertising not only to cease and desist from the original
deceptive advertisements, but affirmatively to disseminate new advertisements designed to correct consumer impressions left by the
original misleading claims.37 The FTC's authority under 15 U.S.C.
§ 45 to order remedial advertising was challenged and approved in
Warner-Lambert Co. v. F.T.C..38 There, the court affirmed an FTC

order requiring the makers of Listerine to disclose in future advertisements that "Listerine will not help prevent colds or sore
throats or lessen their severity."3 9 The FTC had found that Listerine did not reduce the risk of illness, and that the mere cessation
of claims that it did were inadequate to correct consumer misperceptions. Since Warner-Lambert, several courts
have upheld
40
the FTC's power to order corrective advertising.
" Under § 1117, the court has the discretion in exceptional cases to increase damages
up to an amount treble the actual damages.
35 793 F.2d at 1041-42.
" West Bank, 722 F.2d at 413-14 (Iowa law). Big 0, 408 F.Supp. at 1233 (Colorado
law). Because the legislative history of the Lanham Act is unclear as to whether increased
damages are always available, a court as a practical matter can insulate itself from review by
basing its award on state law.
37 See In the Matter of Campbell Soup Co., 77 F.T.C. 664, 668 (1970); Case Comment,
Warner-Lambert Co. v.F.T.C.: The Possibilities and Limitations of Corrective Advertising,
13 New Eng.L.Rev. 348 (1977); Comment, Corrective Advertising-The New Response to
Consumer Deception, 72 Colum.L.Rev. 415 (1972); Richard S. Cornfeld, A New Approach to
an Old Remedy: Corrective Advertising and the Federal Trade Commission, 61 Iowa L.Rev.
693 (1976); Gerald S. Thain, Corrective Advertising: The Theory and Cases, 19 N.Y.L. Forum 1 (1973); Annotation, Power of Federal Trade Commission to Issue Order Requiring
Corrective Advertising, 46 A.L.R.Fed. 905 (1980).
38 562 F.2d 749 (D.C.Cir. 1977).
3 Id. at 752.
'oSee Grolier Inc. v. F.T.C., 699 F.2d 983, 988 (9th Cir. 1983); Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. F.T.C., 605 F.2d 964, 970-71 (7th Cir. 1979); Amrep Corp. v. F.T.C., 768 F.2d
1171, 1180 (10th Cir. 1985). Although in all three cases the FTC's orders were directed at
personal representations made by salespeople, these courts approved of "corrective
advertising."
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In Warner-Lambert,the court affirmed an FTC order that the
corrective statement be made accompanying the next $10 million
worth of advertising spent to promote Listerine, to make up for
almost 100 years of deceptive advertising. 41 On other occasions, the
FTC has required that the defendant spend an amount equal to 25
percent of the money expended in making the deceptive statements, reasoning that less money is necessary to engage the public's attention where a retraction is being made.42 However, the real
cost to an FTC defendant is far less than 25 percent of its advertising budget because the FTC does not require that the defendant
make the retraction in isolation. FTC defendants merely must add
the FTC required language to their normal advertising. The defendant need not waste money on new unbudgeted advertising; it
need only add the corrective phrasing to advertising it already
would have performed.43
Thus, the federal courts' version of corrective advertising is far
more costly to defendants than the remedy as applied by the FTC.
The FTC relief is purely injunctive, forcing deceptive advertisers
to include affirmative disclaimers in the normal course of their advertising campaigns. When the FTC uses a figure of 25 percent of
the defendant's advertising budget, that sum does not impose a
direct loss on the defendant, unlike the federal court remedy which
entails a transfer payment of 25 percent of the defendant's advertising expenditures. The FTC frequently declines to order corrective advertising injunctions. Its standard for using such injunctions, approved as "entirely reasonable" in Warner-Lambert, is
that:
[i]f a deceptive advertisment has played a substantial role in
creating or reinforcing in the public's mind a false and material belief which lives on after the false advertising ceases,
there is clear and continuing injury to competition and to the
consuming public as consumers continue to make purchasing
decisions based on the false belief. Since this injury cannot be
averted by merely requiring respondent to cease disseminating the advertisement, we may appropriately order respon41
42

562 F.2d at 762-64.
Amstar Corp., Trade Reg.Rep. (CCH) 1 20,356 at 20,240 (F.T.C. 1973); American

Home Prod. Corp., Trade Reg.Rep. (CCH) 19,962 at 21,984 (F.T.C. 1972); Sun Oil Co.,
Trade Reg.Rep. (CCH) 1 19,856 at 21,872 and 20,033 at 22,020 (F.T.C. 1972).
43 So, if a marketer of a cure for baldness spends $1 million on advertisements which
contain false statements, the FTC may require that retractions accompany the next
$250,000 of advertisements the defendant buys.
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dent to take affirmative action designed to terminate the otherwise continuing ill effects of the advertisement."'
The remedy of a corrective advertising injunction, as imposed by
5
4
the FTC, may seem "entirely reasonable" to the federal courts,

but it is hardly uncontroversial within the FTC itself.
The FTC hesitates to order corrective advertising injunctions
because the effectiveness of such orders is subject to much debate.
Several studies indicate that corrective advertising injunctions do
not fully undeceive consumers.46 In fact, the remedy imposed in
the Listerine case apparently failed to correct effectively consumer
misperceptions.47 Federal courts who adopt a corrective advertising
rationale should not confuse the Warner-Lambert court's endorsement of the FTC's power to order a corrective advertising injunction with the conclusion that the injunction itself is an effective
remedy. The FTC's infrequent use of corrective advertising injunctions, coupled with studies critical of their effectiveness, indicate
that federal courts adopting the theory have been over-enthusiastic
in their analysis.
One can criticize corrective advertising damage awards in two
ways that go beyond pointing out the federal courts' misperception
of the FTC's corrective advertising injunctive remedy. First, the
damage awards may be unjustified under existing tort damage law.
Second, even if justified by precedent, the damage awards are an
economically inefficient and socially undesirable remedy. Part II
examines the corrective advertising damage rationale under existing law, and Part III explores the economic implications of corrective advertising damage awards.

"

562 F.2d at 762, citing Jacob Siegel Co. v. F.T.C., 327 U.S. 608, 612-13 (1946) (em-

phasis added).

"sIn

Big 0, the Tenth Circuit apparently accepted the plaintiff's argument that "the

Federal Trade Commission often requires businesses who engage in misleading advertising
to spend 25 percent of their advertising budget on corrective advertising." 561 F.2d at 1375.
The court was apparently unaware of the fact that the FTC only very rarely orders corrective advertising. Dee Pridgen, Consumer Protection and the Law § 12.07(3)(d) (1986).
46 Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U.L.Rev. 657, 688-89
(1985), citing Robert F. Dyer and Phillip G. Kuehl, A Longitudinal Study of Corrective
Advertising, 15 J.Market.Res. 39, 46 (1978) and Michael B. Mazis and Janice E. Adkinson,
An Experimental Evaluation of a Proposed Corrective Advertising Remedy, 13
J.Market.Res. 178 (1976).
47 Pridgen, Consumer Protection at § 12.07(3)(d) (cited in note 45).
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II. DAMAGE TO GOOD WILL AND THE INADEQUACY OF THE
CORRECTIVE ADVERTISING DAMAGE AWARD

One startling aspect of the cases discussed in Part I is the

courts' willingness to depart from the traditional rule that "any
award based on plaintiff's damages requires some showing of actual loss [based on] adequate record support for the dollar
amount. ' 48 Courts generally do not permit speculative damages;

plaintiffs carry the burden of proving not only the fact of damage,
but also the amount. An absolutely precise calculation is not required, but damages cannot be computed on "speculation and
guesswork."49
When a plaintiff cannot introduce direct evidence of lost sales,
the court might bar plaintiff's recovery because the court might
regard the plaintiff's damage claim as the result of "speculation
and guesswork." Sometimes, in unfair competition cases, the defendant's infringement clearly has caused actual damage to the
plaintiff, although that damage may be difficult to pinpoint. Courts
have recognized that lost sales and profits are not the only type of
damage which result from unfair competition; often the infringement damages a business' or product's good will 50 as embodied in
its trademark. Corrective advertising damage awards are a response to the compensation problems arising in the unfair competition context. They have two possible justifications. First, they
may be based on the FTC's repair of consumer perception ration-

ale. Second, they may be explained as an attempt to quantify damages to good will in the absence of direct evidence of lost sales. The
first justification explains attempts to measure the cost of actual
repair, while the second explains attempts to measure recovery for
actual loss.

A. Reputation Repair
The first justification for corrective advertising damage awards
emphasizes the need to restore the plaintiff's reputation to its for8 Foxtrap, 671 F.2d at 642. See also St. Charles Mfg. Co. v. Mercer, 737 F.2d at 893;
McCarthy, 2 Trademarks at 509-11 (cited in note 1).
" Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946) (antitrust damages).
10 "Good will" is the value of the association consumers make between a product or
business and its trademark. For example, the total value of all the tangible assets (factory,
inventory, patents, and trade secrets) of the maker of Oreo cookies might be $10 million;
yet, a purchaser would be willing to pay much more than this amount for all the assets and
the right to use the Oreo trademark because of the valuable associations built up between
the cookie and its name. The difference in value between the tangible assets and purchase
price is a rough measure of good will.
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mer level via an actual reparative advertising campaign.5 1 It seeks
to enable the plaintiff to undo the harm done to its reputation by
providing the funds to perform affirmative advertising. Courts
have endorsed the compensability of actual advertising on several
occasions, 5 1 and it seems a small leap to apply the rationale to future reparative advertising expenditures. However, the repair rationale ignores the basic rule of damages that a victim is compensated to mitigate the loss he has suffered, and not for an amount
which necessarily will restore his property to its original condition,
although the two figures are often the same. 3
When cost of repair and lost value are not the same, the court
will award the lower figure. For example, a car accident results in a
dented door which can be repaired for $150. Although the lost
value caused by the dent may be $300, the court will award the
plaintiff only the $150 necessary to repair the dent. 4 Conversely, if
the cost of repair is larger than the value lost to the victim, the
court will not award damages to enable the repair to take place. If
a semi-trailer negligently crashes into and destroys a car worth
$500, tort law measures the victim's damages at $500. In this case,
the measure of damages should not be the amount necessary to
repair the destroyed car which, depending on its condition, may be
many thousands of dollars. 5 It would be grossly inefficient to give
the victim a huge windfall by granting him an award many times
the value of his loss.
The car accident example exposes the faulty reasoning of corrective advertising courts: the amount needed to repair a trademark's reputation does not necessarily provide for efficient mitigation of damages. Big 0 is a good example. At the time of trial, Big
O's total operation, including its trademark and attendant good
will, was worth only $200,000.6 It seems unlikely that it actually
51 See Big 0, 408 F.Supp. at 1232.
11 See cases cited in note 20.
U See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 108-09 (3d ed. 1986) (discussing

efficient damages in contract breach cases).
" It seems counter-intuitive that the expenditure of $150 to repair the dent will restore
$300 to the car's value. Yet, in some markets, the ratio of improvement expenditures to
value is not 1:1. For example, sometimes a $500 coat of paint on an old house will increase
its market value $2000. That significant arbitraging in such markets does not occur may
perhaps be explained by the cost of information or high transaction costs.
15 One can make an argument that the victim's subjective value of having the car repaired rather than replaced may sometimes make a seemingly wasteful repair efficient. See
Timothy J. Muris, Cost of Completion or Diminution in Market Value: The Relevance of
Subjective Value, 12 J. Legal Stud. 379 (1983).

" Big 0, 561 F.2d at 1367.
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sustained a loss of $2.8 million, although in reality it might cost

that much to restore consumer perception of the "BIG FOOT"
trademark to its pre-infringement state. If it costs $2.8 million to
"fix" the trademark, then, as with the totaled car, it is simply not
efficient to do so. 57 On the other hand, the court in Jartran

awarded U-Haul $12 million based on the infringer's advertising
expenditures. U-Haul is a huge multinational corporation. It is entirely possible that it lost substantially more than $12 million in
damage to its good will. 58 Clearly, the propriety of granting dam-

ages on the theory that they are necessary to "repair" a trademark
or restore its good will value cannot be justified under traditional
tort damage principles.
B. Compensation for Damage to Good Will
Money awards based on the defendant's advertising budget
may also be justified as a crude attempt to measure damage to
good will. Some courts have recognized that even absent evidence
of lost profits, damage to good will should be compensated. Such
awards are somewhat controversial given the traditional rule that
plaintiffs must prove actual damages. However, if read closely the
decisions reveal a judicial acknowledgement that actual damage
has occurred to the plaintiff, and the accounting awarded is simply
an estimate of the loss, otherwise difficult to calculate, to the plaintiff's good will. Corrective advertising damage awards may be a
similar attempt to estimate lost good will.
For example, in Maier Brewing Company v. FleischmannDistilling Corp.,59 the Ninth Circuit found that the defendant's use of
the name "Black and White" for beer infringed on the plaintiff's
registered trademark of "Black and White" for Scotch whiskey.
The plaintiff could not prove diversion of sales and consequent lost
profits because the products did not compete with each other. The
court offered a dual rationale for the award requiring an accounting of defendant's profits. First, the court recognized that the defendant had injured the product's good will even absent any direct
competition or lost sales. Second, the court recognized that al57 This point is related to the idea that the defense of wasteful actual corrective advertising should be available when courts wish to award damages based on counter-advertising
performed by the plaintiff. Sometimes actual reparative expenditures may be inefficient. See
note 24 and accompanying text.
58 In 1979-80, U-Haul's annual gross revenues were approximately $400 million. U-Haul
Intern., Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 522 F.Supp. 1238, 1241 (D. Ariz. 1981).
"' 390 F.2d 117 (9th Cir. 1968).
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lowing injury to good will to remain uncompensated, would result

in underdeterrence of unfair competition."0
Maier stands for the proposition that once injury has occurred, the amount of injury must be estimated in order to achieve
an optimal level of deterrence. Presumably, if no damage to good
will occurred, the court would award no money.6 1 The Maier court
estimated that the defendant's profits roughly approximated the
value of the plaintiff's lost good will. 62 It is hardly clear that the

amount of defendant's profits is an accurate estimate of lost good
will, but the court was determined to find some way to compensate
what it felt was a tangible, if difficult to estimate, loss.
Corrective advertising damage awards may be viewed as a parallel attempt to quantify real damage to good will. However,
awards based on the defendant's advertising expenditures seem to
be arbitrary and unrelated to damage to good will. For example,
although evidence showed that some customers thought unfavorably of the Big 0 dealers because they appeared to be palming off
their bias-ply tires as Goodyear radials, the fact that the Goodyear
product was more expensive and of higher quality may have actually improved the marketability of the Big 0 product. In fact, the
court's recognition that there was no proof of lost sales and that
there was an increase in the number of dealers seems to support
the hypothesis that Big O's reputation may have benefited from
the infringement. 3 Good will is a quantifiable asset of a business;
no evidence was submitted which proved its value had diminished.
Even if Big 0 had suffered lost good will, the court's valuation of
the loss via Goodyear's advertising expenditures seems insupportable. The total net worth of Big 0 at the time of trial was
$200,000.4 As a measure of damage to good will, $2.8 million seems
arbitrary.
Similarly, the courts in Jartran,West Bank, and other corrective advertising cases do little more than presume the existence of
harm to good will and award defendant's advertising costs as a
measure of the supposed harm. This is not to say that no harm to
good will occurred in these cases, or that harm to good will and
reputation should not be compensable; but these cases do illustrate
the arbitrariness of basing an award on a proxy for, rather than a
60 Id. at 122-123.

"1 For example, because the infringing product was of high quality.
62 390 F.2d at 123.
63 See text accompanying note 28.
61 561 F.2d at 1367.
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direct evaluation of, damage to good will."
One might level this same criticism, of course, at the remedy
of an accounting. The Maier court, for example, performed no direct calculation of loss to good will. In this sense, corrective advertising damages do seem to have a basis in at least one line of tort
damage law. Thus, the strongest criticism of a corrective advertising damage award is not that it is unprecedented, but that it is
unresponsive to the efficiency goals underlying tort damage law
itself.6
III.

ECONOMICS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF ACCURATE MEASUREMENT OF DAMAGE TO

GOOD

WILL

Corrective advertising damages seek to compensate defendants
for tangible losses to trademark good will. The justification for
awarding damages based on the defendant's advertising budget assumes that unfair competition may damage reputation even absent
direct evidence of lost profits. This section discusses what reputational damages are optimal in the unfair competition context, and
whether corrective advertising substantially approximates those
damages.6 7
A corrective advertising award primarily seeks to address
damage to good will, which, in the cases discussed in this comment,
is substantially the same as damage done to trademark reputation.
A trademark merely embodies good will, as Professor McCarthy
explains:
11 In fact, some courts have rejected claims for monetary awards based on corrective
advertising because the plaintiff has not met the evidentiary burdens normally imposed by
tort law. In Mercer, 737 F.2d 891, a kitchen cabinetmaker sued the developers of a
townhome community who misrepresented that their townhomes would contain the plaintiff's cabinets when in reality they did not. The court granted the cabinetmaker an injunction but refused to award damages "to 'reverse advertise' to overcome any damage to their
reputations that defendants' actions might have caused." Id. at 893. The court refused to
award damages because "plaintiffs introduced no evidence showing any damage to their reputations." Id.
Similarly, in Engineered Mechanical Serv. v. Applied Mech. Tech., Inc., 591 F.Supp.
962 (M.D.La. 1984), the court held that damages for corrective advertising would not be
awarded where "the plaintiffs have presented no evidence on loss of good will, damage to
their reputation, the need for corrective advertising and no evidence of any numerical values
on which such an estimate could be based." Id. at 966.
" These efficiency goals are recognized in Maier when the court speaks of the need to
deter the defendant's behavior through the award of an accounting. 390 F.2d at 122-123.
Part III explores whether corrective advertising provides optimal deterrence.
67 This comment relies primarily on the descriptive economic tort theories contained in
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law (1986)
Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (cited in note 53); and William Landes and Richard Posner, Trademarks: An Economic Model (forthcoming).
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Good will and its symbol, a trademark, are inseparable. A
trademark has no independent significance apart from the
good will it symbolizes. If there is no business and no good
will, a trademark symbolizes nothing. 8
A trademark has value because consumers associate a certain level
of product quality with it; a trademark also makes the product easier to remember and find. The connection the consumer makes between a trademark and a product is crucial to a product's success.
If Coca-Cola changed its name to "Fizzy Cola," it would experience
a substantial decline in sales, even if the beverage's ingredients remained unchanged. The plummeting sales would indicate loss of
the good will that the company had built through decades of successful promotion of the name Coca-Cola. When consumers' ability
to associate products and their trademarks is hampered, a very
real financial loss of good will results.
A. Optimal Deterrence of Damage to Good Will
Tort law attempts to provide optimal deterrence of opportunistic behavior by forcing the tortfeasor to internalize the social
cost of his actions. Forcing him to pay too much encourages him to
take more care than is efficient; forcing him to pay too little encourages him to take less care than is efficient. However, before
addressing the evils of miscompensation, this comment will discuss
some preliminary points about the optimal level of damages for
lost good will and whether corrective advertising awards approximate that level.
1. Accuracy of CompensatoryDamages. The primary problem
with corrective advertising damage awards is that the defendant's
advertising expenditures are arbitrary and, depending on the particular fact situation, provide a figure which may be substantially
more or less than the actual damage to good will. Big 0 offers a
good example of plaintiff overcompensation. 9 One might also imagine a damage award based on the defendant's advertising costs
that would undercompensate a plaintiff. For example, a rival of
McDonald's might spend a mere $100 to print up leaflets accusing
McDonald's of using worm meat in its hamburgers. Harm to McDonald's reputation might be substantial, yet an award based on
advertising costs would not exceed $100. Under the traditional economic model, all actual damages are calculated and then adjusted
68 McCarthy, 1 Trademarks at 76 (cited in note 1).

"' See text at notes 26-29, 63-64.
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to take into account the possibility that the tortfeasor might not be
caught. The size of the defendant's advertising budget is irrelevant.7 ° The arbitrary nature of corrective advertising awards and
their lack of consistent relation to actual damages powerfully demonstrates their inefficiency.
Another observation indicates that corrective advertising damage awards may consistently result in overcompensation. Corrective advertising awards non-incremental damages: the court awards
the plaintiff all of his damages, not just those caused by the unfair
competition. Non-incremental damages result in overcompensation.7 1 For example, McDonald's sells a roast beef sandwich; Burger King sells a similar sandwich with a similar name. If damages
for lost profits are granted, Burger King will have to disgorge all of
its profits, including those it would have made anyway had it given
its product a totally different name. McDonald's will have recovered all of Burger King's profits even though only some were due
to customer confusion. Burger King would have earned most of the
profits anyway-taken from undeceived Burger King customers
who decided they wanted a roast beef sandwich instead of a
hamburger. An incremental measure of damages would award McDonald's only the amount of damage caused by the customer confusion, not the entire amount earned by Burger King. One achieves
optimal deterrence only when the incremental damage amount is
awarded.
A final reason to suspect that corrective advertising damages
overcompensate plaintiffs is that the cost to defendants of the injunctive relief granted is not subtracted from the award. When the
sum awarded to the plaintiff is that necessary to compensate him
fully for his actual damages, the court should not take the cost of
an injunction into account. However, when courts increase the
award beyond mere compensation in order to increase deterrence,
the cost of the injunction properly is considered.
For example, if a court determined a plaintiff's loss was $1
million, and that a total cost of $2 million should be imposed on
the defendant to deter him and others in the future, it should order the defendant to pay the plaintiff $1 million. The remaining $1
million penalty which the defendant must incur should be reduced
11 Actually, advertising budget size and the risk of apprehension may be inversely related. The larger the defendant's advertising budget, the greater the chance of apprehension; therefore, damages arguably should be diminished in some situations.
7' Richard Craswell and John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2
J.L.Econ. & Org. 279, 297 (1986).
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by the cost of the injunction. If the injunction alone imposed more
than $1 million in costs on the defendant, no further transfer payments to the plaintiff are necessary.
Injunctions are costly. It is expensive to change the name of a
product line; the injunction may render some manufactured products completely unsalable. Although courts often deny damages because a preliminary injunction seems sufficient punishment, 2
courts generally do not subtract the cost of an injunction once they
award increased damages. This results in higher than optimal damages even if corrective advertising monetary awards are otherwise
proper.
In response to the criticisms above, one might offer some defenses of corrective advertising damage awards. At least one commentator has argued that if a particular legal rule is absolutely
clear and certain, courts can award damages at immense levels
without fear of overdeterrence because all actors will stay just to
the compliance side of the liability line without fear of incurring
any loss. 73 It is difficult to argue that overcompensation is bad in
this clear rule scenario because increasing the size of the award
does not affect the level of care: actors will not back further away
from the liability line.
Given this theory, one can argue that corrective advertising
damage awards are like harmlessly increased damages for the violation of a clear legal rule. However, there exist three responses to
this argument. First, there is no indication that legal rules are certain in cases where courts have awarded corrective advertising
damages. For example, in Big 0 the only legal precedent on point
indicated that the sort of reverse confusion caused by Goodyear
was not actionable, but the court, nevertheless, awarded huge damages.74 Second, if corrective advertising is a smokescreen for increased damages, courts should stop claiming a compensation rationale and articulate why punitive damages are appropriate.
Finally, there is no reason to believe that corrective advertising
damage awards result from a rational analysis of any actual harm
to plaintiffs. Courts neither quantify actual harm nor explain any
logical relationship between advertising expenditures and the need
to deter the defendant's conduct in a particular case.
2. Imperfect Enforcement. Because no law is perfectly enSee Champion Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 131 (1947).
Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 Colum.L.Rev. 1523 (1984).
7' 561 F.2d at 1371, citing Westward Coach Manufacturing Co. v. Ford Motor
Co., 388
F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1968) (applying Indiana law).
71
73
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forced, corrective advertising damages may be an attempt to provide efficient deterrence by increasing awards to compensate for
the chance that the tortfeasor may not face suit. If a tortfeasor
knows that he will not always be caught, forcing him merely to
compensate the plaintiff for the damage done when he is caught
will not deter him from acting illegally again.
Conventional economic analysis of damages takes into account
the teaching that "the optimum penalty is simply the social cost of
the unlawful act divided by the desired probability that the penalty will in fact be imposed. '7 5 In unfair competition cases, courts
traditionally have required the defendant to compensate the plaintiff for all of the plaintiff's losses including lost profits, damage to
good will, and other infringement related expenses. In theory, this
level of damages might not provide incentives for the tortfeasor to
take an efficient level of care because courts normally do not increase damages in variation with the tortfeasor's probability of apprehension. Perhaps the large damage awards sometimes provided
by corrective advertising are judicial attempts to achieve optimal
deterrence by considering the likelihood that an infringer will get
away with his misdeed. However, one can offer several criticisms of
this explanation. First, it is difficult to hide an act of trademark
infringement. By its nature, a trademark has a conspicuous public
presence; the chances of infringement escaping detection are low.
Therefore, any increase in actual damages should be relatively minor. Certainly an award many times the possible actual harm, as
was granted in Big 0, seems unjustified.
Second, courts may be considering imperfect enforcement silently and multiplying total damages by one over the chance of
apprehension. If so, then they are using the wrong number as a
multiplicand. In order to arrive at the damage figure providing for
optimal deterrence, one should multiply one over the chance of apprehension by the amount of incremental damages, not the amount
of total damages.7 6 If one uses the amount of total damages, defendants will be deterred from causing any loss to the plaintiff,
while optimally one only wants to deter a defendant from imposing
losses which are illegal for him to cause. By using the plaintiff's
total losses as the multiplicand, the cofrective advertising courts
are compounding the problem of non-incremental damages, discussed above in subsection one. Even taking into account the need
71 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 171 (2d ed. 1977) (speaking of deterrence in the criminal law context).
76 Craswell and Calfee, 2 J.L.Econ. & Org. at 292-297 (cited in note 71).
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to increase damages in response to imperfect enforcement, corrective advertising damages still miscompensate.
3. Uncertain Legal Standards. Traditional damage theory
may not completely explain all of the elements of optimal deterrence. Recent scholarship indicates that a given level of damages
may result in overcompensation or undercompensation depending
on the clarity of the relevant legal rules."
Taking the likelihood of the defendant facing suit into account, as discussed in subsection two above, provides for efficient
deterrence only if the probability of punishment is constant. If the
tortfeasor knows that his chance of getting caught is one out of
three, a court confidently can triple the incremental damages done
to the victim in order to provide optimal deterrence. But what if
the legal rule governing the tortfeasor's actions is unclear? To determine optimal damages, a court must evaluate the chance of apprehension not only in light of the probability of the broken rule's
enforcement, but also with reference to the certainty with which
the defendant knew he was breaking the legal rule. Corrective advertising damages may be justifiable, perhaps, given the degree of
legal uncertainty in the field of unfair competition.
Knowledge of the relative clarity of legal rules governing unfair competition would allow a more perfect critique of corrective
advertising damage awards. The clarity of legal rules directly affects actors attempting to conform to a legal standard. The predictability of application of legal rules has important ramifications
for all tort law because it calls into question the traditional assumption that compensatory damages provide incentives for optimal deterrence. Two commentators explain:
Uncertainty creates a positive chance that someone who violates the legal standard will not be punished, thus reducing
the incentives to comply [underdeterrence] . . . . However,
uncertainty often allows an actor to reduce the probability of
punishment even further by "playing it safe" and modifying
his behavior by more than the law requires [overdeterrence]. 8
Therefore, the level of damages necessary to provide optimal deterrence depends upon the uncertainty of the underlying legal rule.
In general, given a fixed level of damages, relatively small uncertainty will lead to overdeterrence and broad uncertainty will lead

77 Id. at 279.
78 Id. at 279-80.
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to underdeterrence.79

Unfortunately, even if one could quantify the clarity of substantive legal rules governing unfair competition, such a task is beyond the scope of this comment. However, even without pinpointing the exact level of uncertainty, it seems that corrective
advertising damages cannot be justified within the uncertain legal
standard framework. First, it seems unlikely that an arbitrary compensation scheme like corrective advertising could provide proper
incentives because of the inconsistency inherent in such a rule. Arbitrariness leads to over- or underdeterrence, even if we do not
know the degree of legal uncertainty.80
Second, the non-incremental nature of corrective advertising
damages suggests that overcompensation occurs even without an
exact quantification of legal certainty. The damage awards in the
cases discussed in this comment seem to be substantially in excess
of actual loss to the tort victim. Professors Craswell and Calfee
have calculated optimal multipliers given varying degrees of legal
uncertainty and concluded that the proper number by which to
multiply the total social cost of the tort typically is not much
larger than one."' This indicates that even given a wide range of
uncertainty, corrective advertising damages overcompensate. Corrective advertising damages therefore are not justifiable as implicit
adjustments for the uncertainty of legal standards governing unfair
competition.
B. Effects of Miscompensation
When a manufacturer markets an infringing product, it may
be liable for damages caused by the infringement. Because of this
possibility, a manufacturer must take care before it markets a new
product to search for existing trademarks, trade dress, or product
configurations which its product may infringe. If courts consistently award plaintiffs higher than optimal damages for infringement, the manufacturer must take increased care in order to lessen
potential liability for infringement. 82 If courts consistently award
less than optimal damages, a manufacturer will take less care because it faces a decreased risk of loss. Overcompensation and
overdeterrence result in fewer and costlier new products; unId. at 280.
"oHowever, if the rule was absolutely clear, an arbitrary award over a compensatory
level would be efficient.
81 Craswell and Calfee, 2 J.L.Econ. & Org. at 294 and table 8 (cited in note 71).
82 See Landes and Posner, Trademarks (cited in note 67).
79
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dercompensation and underdeterrence result in more infringement
creating consumer confusion, higher consumer search costs, and
fewer incentives to market high quality goods. 8
1. Overcompensation. Overcompensation results in three main
evils. First, manufacturers will introduce fewer new products, especially cheaper products which may exploit markets created by preexisting goods, because of the increased risk of damages. Manufacturers will not be willing to market goods which bear a close
resemblance to those already on the market. They will hesitate to
provide consumers with cheap copies of products in high demand
because such marketing behavior sometimes results in lawsuits.
However, merely because product copying sometimes is illegal
does not justify overdeterring all copying. One must remember
that all copying is not infringement. Copying of products, excluding their trademarks, is completely permissible absent a patent.8 4
Although some Lanham Act decisions have recognized that products can act as their own trademarks and therefore can obtain
some protection from copying, 5 in general, copying of unpatented
objects is permitted. This policy stimulates competition and results in cheaper products being made available to the consumer.
Higher damage awards decrease the likelihood that a manufacturer
will market a possibly infringing product. As a result, some noninfringing products will not be produced because of the enhanced
risk.8 6 This results in fewer product choices for consumers and less
price-lowering competition.
Second, fear of inordinately high damage awards increases
marketing research costs. One must take excessive care when
overly high risk has been created. A regime of huge damage awards
for infringement forces manufacturers to spend large amounts for
trademark searches and legal opinions regarding infringement.
These costs are passed on to consumers in the product's price.
Finally, high damage awards not only affect cases which go to
trial, they also affect settlement negotiations. A legal rule allowing
exorbitant damages provides plaintiffs with extra leverage when
settlement talks begin. Although a plaintiff's case may be weak,
fear of excessive damages may cause the defendant to settle for an
83

Id.

See, for example, Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1963) (Court
held that federal patent law preempted much common law protection of unpatented product configurations).
85 See, for example, LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 1985).
86 This is subject, of course, to the certainty of the legal rules governing infringement.
Since this section assumes miscompensation, the legal uncertainty variable will be ignored.
84
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inefficient amount rather than risk trial. This possibility compounds an inefficient damage measure's distorting effect on the
market.
2. Undercompensation.Undercompensation is equally inefficient. When courts undercompensate plaintiffs, courts do not deter
manufacturers from marketing infringing products. Three main
problems result from increased infringement. First, consumer confusion results. Consumers frequently may buy one product thinking it is another. Purchasing errors are costly and result in wasted
resources.
Second, consumer difficulty in differentiating between infringing products and the products they desire raises consumer search
costs. Consumers must spend more time finding exactly the product they desire when the convenient mnemonic device of the trademark is untrustworthy.
Third, undercompensation resulting in increased infringement
lowers manufacturers' incentive to market high quality goods.
Since high quality goods are expensive to manufacture, consumer
association ,of quality with the product name is particularly important. Production of cheap imitations bearing names which deceive
consumers weakens the connection between the name and quality
of the original high quality good. Eventually, a manufacturer has
no incentive to spend the extra money to produce high quality
goods because it will be unable to make a profit-too many consumers will buy what they think are the manufacturer's high quality goods at the lower price charged by the infringer. Clearly, undercompensation is as great a vice as overcompensation.

IV.

NECESSITY OF DIRECT VALUATION OF DAMAGE TO GOOD WILL

Tort law seeks to minimize social costs through optimal deterrence. The optimal level of compensation balances the need to deter the marketing of confusing products and the need to encourage
low cost product development and competition. In determining the
optimal sanction to impose one must first calculate as precisely as
possible the victim's actual damages. All methods of fixing damages involve awarding damages equal either to actual damages or
to actual damages multiplied by some variable. Because corrective
advertising damages do not provide an accurate measure of damage to good will, courts must use a more accurate method. Accounting procedures which measure good will may offer far more
precise estimates of actual damage than arbitrary awards of corrective advertising.
Although no trademark infringement decisions detail how loss
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to good will should be calculated,17 cases in antitrust,8 8 condemna-

tion, 89 marital dissolution," probate, 91 partnership," tax, 93 and
tort" demonstrate judicial willingness to set a dollar value on good
will. Formulas tailored to the needs of these varying fact situations
have been developed to measure good willY5 Courts can adopt one
of these formulas to determine damages to good will in unfair competition actions.
A. Warning and Encouragement
Before examining specific approaches, several important
points should be noted. The examples which follow are paradigms;
they do not purport to set rules which govern the whole panoply of
variations on the unfair competition theme. Rather, they merely
illustrate the possibility of accurately calculating good will losses.
Due to the specificity required in valuing good will, some caveats
regarding the speculative nature of these general examples are discussed in subsection one below.
1. Variables and Multipliers. All of the examples below use

the same multipliers and variables. However, intuition tells one
that rates of return for different types of assets are not identical,
nor should all capitalization occur at the same rate. In an actual
'7 Century Distilling Co. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 86 F.Supp. 503, 505 (E.D.Pa.
1949), aff'd 205 F.2d 140 (3d Cir. 1953) (expert witnesses allowed to calculate good will
value; but methodologies were not discussed).
" Standard Oil Company of California v. Moore, 251 F.2d 188, 219-20 (9th Cir. 1957).
" Kimball Laundry Co. v. U.S., 338 U.S. 1 (1949).
90 Mueller v. Mueller, 144 Cal.App.2d 245, 301 P.2d 90, 94-5 (1956).
91 Copland v. Wisconsin Department of Taxation, 16 Wis.2d 543, 114 N.W.2d 858, 86467 (1962).
" Lyon v. Lyon, 54 Cal.Rptr. 829, 246 Cal.App.2d 519 (1966); Murray v. Bateman, 315
Mass. 113, 51 N.E.2d 954 (1943).
"I Courier Journal Job Printing Co. v. Glenn, 37 F.Supp. 55, 59-60 (W.D.Ky. 1941),
aff'd 127 F.2d 820 (6th Cir. 1942).
" Carrey v. Boyes Hot Springs Resort, Inc., 54 Cal.Rptr. 199, 245 Cal.App.2d 618, 62223 (1966).
"' Edward J. Schnee, Acquiring Assets by Purchasing Corporate Stock, 13 Tax Adviser
354, 361-63 (1982) (valuation for tax considerations); Comment, Professional Goodwill in
Louisiana: An Analysis of its Classification, Valuation, and Partition, 43 La.L.Rev. 119
(1982) (valuation in marital dissolution setting); Patricia K. Ganier, Treatment of Good
Will: Allocating a Lump-Sum Purchase Price Among Mixed Assets of a Going Business, 7
J.Corp.Tax 111 (1980) (valuation for sale purposes); Gregory M. Bergman, The Valuation of
Goodwill, L.A.Bar J. 87 (Aug. 1977) (discussion of methods used by California courts); Note,
Valuation of Good Will for Tax Purposes, 48 Va.L.Rev. 1274 (1962); Note, An Inquiry into
the Nature of Goodwill, 53 Colum.L.Rev. 660 (1953); Forensic Economics-Valuation of
Business and Business Losses, 16 Am.Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 253, 375-84 (1978) (valuation of
good will of professional practice, Good Will, 5 Am.Jur. Proof of Facts 505 (1960).
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unfair competition case, the rate of return on tangible assets may
be more accurately determined by reference to the average rate of
return for similar businesses or professions rather than by the rate
fixed by the IRS. Similarly, the capitalization rate employed will
depend on the type of business, and the suggested period over
which capitalization is calculated will vary with the stability of the
particular business. By applying current procedures and developing new ones, accountants and other experts should be able to adjust for these variables and refine the science of good will damage
calculation considerably.
2. Advertising and Profitability.Several studies have provided
information about the relation between the value of advertising
over time on the one hand and profitability on the other.9 6 Further
development in this area may improve estimates of good will's capitalization period. These studies should also result in more accurate calculations of the extent of damage done by false advertising
and trademark infringement.
3. New Businesses and Products. Determining the good will
damage to relatively new businesses or prodhcts presents particularly difficult problems. Courts historically have refused to speculate on the profits a new business might have earned. Calculating
the good will of a new business is no less speculative. As in other
damage contexts, courts must determine the possibility of calculating the good will of a new business or product on an individual
basis.
Overall, because they seek to value good will directly, accounting techniques provide more accurate measurements and, therefore, if utilized, will produce damage awards which deter infringement more efficiently than do awards based on corrective
advertising. Even so, room for improvement exists and improvement will certainly come to pass as increasingly complex responses
to the valuation problem develop.
B.

Calculating Good Will Loss of a Business

"Yummy Foods" is a well-established and prosperous supermarket. Hoping to capitalize on Yummy Foods' reputation for providing high quality goods and services, a local entrepreneur opens
a small convenience store called "Yum E. Treats" in the same
town as Yummy Foods. Yum E. Treats sells a small variety of low

" See, e.g., Meryl Paula Gardner, Advertising Effects on Attributes Recalled and Criteria Used for Brand Evaluations, 10 J.Cons.Res. 310-18 (1985).

19881

Money Damages and Corrective Advertising

quality foodstuffs, trinkets, and tasteless magazines (products not
sold by Yummy Foods). Given a finding of infringement under the
Lanham Act and common law, Yummy Foods is entitled to an injunction as well as any lost profits and actual damages it can prove.
Upset by the numerous complaints Yummy Foods has received
about the low quality and offensive nature of some of Yum E.
Treats' inventory, Yummy Foods suspects that its reputation has
been damaged. However, it has no proof of any lost sales. In fact,
Yummy Foods has lost no sales directly to Yum E. Treats because
the store was located on the opposite side of town and may have
diverted business only from other convenience stores in the
vicinity.
A business which suspects damage to its good will may use
several accounting techniques to measure its loss, if any. All involve a differential comparison of the good will value of the business before and after the infringement. One simple measure of
the good will value of a business is the difference in the value of
the business' tangible assets, such as buildings and inventory, and
the appraisal value of the business as a whole. 98 The difference between the value of the assets and the appraisal value of the business before and after the infringement then represents the damage
to good will. Of course, appraisal value may be highly subjective,
generating expert witness problems seen in other valuation contexts. However, appraisal would be more reliable if the courts required the value to be tied to a concrete pre-infringement offer for
the business or product line or, more conveniently, to a comparison
of rates of return on capital invested in the same market.9 9
The IRS frequently employs the above method, the "gap the-

97All of these techniques also involve a measurement of the business' revenue flow.
Therefore, the value of good will tends to vary directly with profits, although it need not,
since a profitless company may still have substantial good will in its name (i.e., under a
different name it might have lost even more money).
" Ganier, 7 J.Corp.Tax at 121 (cited in note 95).
" See Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 601 F.2d 609, 615 (2d Cir. 1979) (contract damages based on profits made by similar brands of beer sold in the same market). For example,
if the plaintiff were a beer distributor, one would determine a typical rate of return on
capital invested in similarly situated distributorships. If the plaintiff earned an average of 3
percent above the typical rate before infringement and during the infringement it only
earned 2 percent below the typical rate, the 5 percent net drop in relation to the norm
might be attributable to the infringement. The comparison to similarly situated businesses
allows damages to be adjusted in spite of fluctuations affecting the entire market. Even if a
plaintiff's rate of return may have increased as compared to its previous performance, it
may be less productive in relation to its market peers who may have experienced an even
greater growth. This is evidence of lost good will which may be attributable to infringement.
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ory. ' ° It works well when tangible assets and appraisal value are
easily determinable; however, business conditions may make appraisal value uncertain. 10 1 Another approach responds to this difficulty by using a business' annual earnings, rather than an expert's
appraisal value, to calculate the value of the entire business. 2 The
value of tangible assets is then subtracted and whatever remains
represents good will. More specifically, this approach employs the
following steps to determine good will:
(1) Compute the average annual earnings of the firm for a period of not less than five years immediately preceding the valuation date;
(2) Compute the average annual value of the tangible. assets
for the firm for the same period;
(3) Determine an annual return on the tangible assets by multiplying the value of the tangible assets by a stated rate of
03
return;1
(4) Subtract the annual return on tangible assets from the annual average earnings;
(5) Determine the value of good will by capitalizing'" the excess return computed in the prior step. 0 5
To determine damages, this calculation must be performed twice:
once to determine the good will value before the infringement and
once to determine its value after the infringement ceases.
For example, if Yummy Foods earned $1 million per year for
the five years preceding the infringement and the average value of
its assets (primarily buildings and inventory) were $10 million, one
can make the following calculation. Using the IRS suggested rate
of return of 8 percent and capitalization rate of 15 percent, the
good will value of the business before the infringement is $1.33
Ganier, 7 J.Corp.Tax at 123 (cited in note 95).
See McCarthy, 1 Trademarks at 84 (cited in note 1).
0'2An expert appraiser may use the firm's earnings as a basis for his appraisal, making

200
1I

the two methods converge to a certain degree.
1I The rate of return on an asset is the ratio of the income that the asset normally
generates in a year to the price of the asset.
104 Capitalizing involves a calculation of the amount necessary to generate a certain
level of income-basically the reverse of calculating a rate of return. For example, if the rate
of capitalization is 10 percent, then the amount of capital necessary to generate $100,000 is
$1 million. However, these figures depend on the length of time over which one capitalizes.
The capitalization period in the case of good will is business or product specific because it
varies substantially with the fame and reputation of the trademark.
10I Schnee, 13 Tax Adviser at 361 (cited in note 95). For step (3), the IRS suggests a
rate of 8 percent for low risk firms and 10 percent for high risk firms. For step (5) the IRS
suggests rates of 15 percent for low risk firms and 20 percent for high risk firms.
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million.10 6 If one performed the calculation again to evaluate the
value of good will at the time the infringement ceased, producing a
figure of $1 million, then the total compensable damages would be
$330,000.
Both the earnings calculation method and the appraisal value
methods are problematic, however. As mentioned earlier, many
market variables affect the outcome of these calculations, and appraisal value may be overly subjective and subject to manipulation
by experts. And, various causation arguments may reduce or eliminate the damage award because a portion of a business' good will
value can be attributed to non-trademark factors, such as location,
service, and building quality. 107 If during the period of infringement other events have occurred that might account for a decrease
in the value of good will, such as the opening of a new and better
store nearby, an employee strike, or a leaky roof, courts should decrease damages accordingly.
Some fact situations will present complex accounting
problems, but such difficulties are not unique to the unfair competition context. Because accounting methods attempt to measure
the exact extent of damage to good will, they are preferable to the
totally arbitrary figure generated by basing an award on a defendant's advertising expenditures.
C.

Calculating Product Good Will

Often a business' or corporation's reputation is unharmed
when one of its products is infringed. Generally, the good will associated with the infringed product's trademark rather than the company's overall reputation suffers the most damage. One must adapt
the methods discussed in subsection B above to measure such
damage. Calculations of product good will may be more accurate
than calculations of business good will because unlike business
good will, which may include such factors as location and service, a
particular product's good will is embodied entirely in its trademark. Fewer elements affect the causation question.
For example, Flusho Corporation sells several products, one of
'"

This figure is derived from the computation:
$1,000,000 -

(.08 X $10,000,000)
.15

McCarthy notes that the figure obtained also varies with the number of years over which
the good will is capitalized. 1 Trademarks at 80-82 (cited in note 1).
107 Bergman, 53 L.A.Bar J. at 95-96 (cited in note 95).
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which is Humectroid shampoo. A competitor, jealous of Humectroid shampoo's success, markets Humectrin conditioner. If liability
is established, Flusho will be entitled to an injunction. However,
Flusho will have difficulty in computing lost profits because
Humectrin conditioner did not compete directly with Humectroid
shampoo. Even so, depending on the quality and success of
Humectrin conditioner, the good will of the Humectroid trademark
may have been damaged.
Courts can calculate the value of a trademark's good will as
the hypothetical loss which would be incurred if one changed the
product's name. For example, if BMW changed its name completely, it would sell far fewer cars and would be able to charge less
for each one.1 08 Presumably in the future the car's quality'would
again become known to the public through its new trademark, and
sales and profit margin would again be back to normal. The difference in expected net earnings from the time of the cessation of the
use of "BMW" until the reassociation of the car with its new
trademark represents the monetary value of the good will of the
BMW trademark. One could also calculate this same figure by
finding the difference between the value of a typical BMW
franchise and a hypothetical franchise which sold BMW cars under
a different name. Both methods involve the same comparison of
appraisal values before and after the infringement as required for
the IRS "gap" method. Depending on the product and market, this
value will be more or less easy to determine accurately.
With a few adjustments, the second method described in Section B can also be used to determine damages to a product's good
will in a more concrete manner.0 ' The formula might be adapted
as follows:
(1) Compute the average annual earnings from product sales
for a period of not less than five years immediately preceding
the valuation date;
(2) Compute the average annual cost of production and
marketing;
(3) Determine an annual return on a sum equivalent to the
total cost of production and marketing;
(4) Subtract the annual return calculated in step (3) from the
average annual earnings;
108Assume

that it would not be allowed to establish its new name with reference to its
old one as did Datsun when it changed to Nissan.
109 See text accompanying notes 100-105.
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(5) Determine the value of the good will by capitalizing the
excess return computed in the prior step.
With this method, one can determine the damage to good will in
the Humectroid infringement example above. Assume that Humectroid's average annual sales are $10 million and its average annual
production and marketing costs are $9 million. Using the IRS suggested rate of return of 8 percent and a capitalization rate of 15
percent, Humectroid shampoo's pre-infringement good will value is
$1.83 million. 110 If the value of the good will post-infringement was
$1.5 million, a court would assess damages of $330,000.
Again, a variety of factors affect the validity of the $330,000
figure. If the FDA had forced Flusho to put a health warning on
Humectroid shampoo that significantly affected sales during the
time of the infringement, a court should reduce or eliminate damages. Such a factor makes the accounting problem more difficult,
but not impossible. Business and product lines are sold every day.
Investment bankers, business brokers, and accounting firms frequently value good will for sale purposes.1 1 Expert witnesses or
special masters can deal with the interplay of variables. Such aspects of valuing good will are not unique to unfair competition but
arise in most tort damage calculations.
CONCLUSION

Courts realize that unfair competition may damage business or
product good will despite lack of evidence of lost profits. However,
courts have yet to develop a sound rationale for calculating the
amount of damage to good will. The arbitrariness of basing a damage award on the advertising budget of an infringer upsets the efficient balance which tort law seeks to establish between overcompensation and undercompensation. Such inefficiency harms both
businesses and consumers. The solution is to employ accounting
methods which can accurately measure good will, rather than to
rely on a proxy such as defendant's advertising expenditures.
Although procedures have not yet been refined to address all
of the accounting problems inherent in the unfair competition context, there is no reason to expect that unfair competition damages
110

This figure is derived from the following computation:

$10,000,000 - $9,000,000 - ($10,000,000 X .08)
.15
111 For a particularly sophisticated method of business valuation see Alfred Rappaport,

Financial Analysis of Mergers and Acquisitions, J.Merg. & Acq. 18-36 (Win. 1976).
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and accounting methods cannot evolve in much the same way personal injury damages have developed to compensate plaintiffs
more precisely for injury. Judges in personal injury cases stemming
from auto accidents do not throw up their hands and calculate
damages based on the amount the negligent driver spent to buy his
car. Judges in unfair competition cases should not ignore traditional tort rules or economic common sense and base damages on
the infringer's advertising costs. A more rigorous look at valuing
good will is necessary.

